There are many interpretations of the political landscape, especially during election time. But few perspectives analyze the Argentine political phenomenon from a communication standpoint.  

In this interview, Damián Fernández Pedemonte, director of the School of Postgraduate Studies in Communication, offers a preview of his book. “The gap between narrative and conversation: Argentine political communication, from 2001 to the pandemic” which provides a look at the last few years of the Argentine political scene from the perspective of the Academy.

“My aim with this book is that, through concrete, real-life cases, readers will find lessons for political management,” Pedemonte stated at the book launch. Through the description of Argentina's tensions, crises, and conflicts in recent years, Pedemonte attempts to merge and connect his studies and experience as a professor to offer a detached perspective on how models of political communication analysis in the country function, based on the interplay of language. 

How would you describe Argentine political communication during the period analyzed in “The Gap Between Narrative and Conversation”?

The period covered by the book, from the 2001 crisis to the pandemic, is structured as a narrative in which Argentine political communication features three main actors: Kirchnerism, Macri's administration, and the media. Kirchnerism emerges as a discursive event, a new way of speaking in Argentina that understands populism as a discourse. From then on, government communication becomes professionalized, marking a milestone in the history of Argentine democracy as it is the first time this has occurred.

On the other hand, I also believe that the media are highly relevant political actors in shaping public discourse and that they compete with Kirchnerism for control of social representation. The media intervene in political communication by disseminating media stories, establishing topics, and shaping opinions. Over the period analyzed in the book, we see an evolution of the media, since, while in the first period there were media defined as “hegemonic,” now we find ourselves with the “platformization of politics,” where politics has largely lost its capacity for control. 

And finally, Macrism is a third actor that emerges from Kirchnerism as an ideological alternative and as an alternative also from the point of view of communication models, but which never manages to materialize. 

The aim of this book is to cover the three moments in which political communication becomes most evident: in everyday situations, in times of crisis, and during elections. It uses theory to connect these concepts to the narrative through real-life case studies related to these aspects. 

What discursive strategy do Kirchnerism and Macriism use? What are their main differences? 

The political divide is also reflected in communication. Communication models are based on the politician's understanding of three key areas: their relationship with the media, their relationship with the public, and how they should act in the face of public conflict. In each of these areas, the Kirchnerist narrative contrasts sharply with the conversation that the Macri administration seeks to establish. 

For example, from the beginning of her term, Cristina's narrative portrayed the media as the main adversary because, from her perspective, they told a different story. In contrast, the dialogue strategy pursued by the Macri administration fostered a relationship with the media based on freedom of expression. 

On the other hand, in relation to the public, Kirchnerism consists of addressing a majority, all those who are in favor, and finding more supporters for that majority, while the Macri-style conversation tries to go to the direct relationship with the neighbor. 

And in times of crisis, Kirchnerism needs to construct an enemy. This allows it to secure the loyalty of its own supporters, and the relationship with that enemy—corporations, businesses, agriculture, the media, among others—is one of conflict. Meanwhile, the Macri administration's approach aims to respect institutions, the independence of the judiciary, and achieve consensus. 

Can it be said that there is any similarity in the discursive form? 

Although there are no similarities in their communication styles, there is a relationship of interdependence. The divide creates the perception that there are only two possibilities, each opposed to the other and mutually reinforcing. For example, Cristina's government has been labeled populist, but Kirchnerism has never called itself that; rather, this label comes from the opposition. And the same is true of Macri's government: Cristina labels Macri's government as neoliberal, and it is she herself who defines what neoliberalism is and why it is bad. 

When would you place the true birth of the divide in Argentina?

The term "the divide" originated with Lanata and dates back to the Menem era, the time of the pardons, but it only became popular under Kirchnerism. It's a cyclical phenomenon, because the more people dwell on the divide, the deeper the gap becomes. Furthermore, the divide also exists in terms of how communication is understood and its purpose. The ideas are very different under Kirchnerism and Macriism.

Do you think that the theory you present in your book and the model of political communication in Argentina is applicable to other countries?

In Latin America, we see these models repeated in countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. There is also a similarity across the region regarding the relationship with the media and a slow adoption of digital tools. What is new today are the challenges of governance and growing dissatisfaction. This reflects the current era, where there is less social cohesion and it is more difficult to achieve majorities due to the presence of environmental, feminist, and indigenous movements, among many others, which are fragmented and sometimes defend their identity against the rest of society.

Do you think Milei is a new actor? 

Yes, and his prominence is growing. He's already a well-known figure because his rhetoric is similar to Bolsonaro's in Brazil or Trump's, for example. He could be considered a right-wing populist, an amalgam of liberalism and anti-establishment sentiment. What he's capitalizing on is the deep frustration of society, which feels that both Macri's and Kirchner's administrations have failed. 

This phenomenon is quite confusing, given that his platform is extremely radical. People are showing a very high intention to vote for Milei, despite disagreeing with his proposals; it's more of an emotional manifestation driven by anger than a decision based on rationality.

How might Milei's prominence change in the current model of political communication? 

From a campaign perspective, I don't see anything new. This story is divided into three chapters: the first is the primaries, the second is election day, and the third is everything that will happen after the election. 

The divide is no longer limited to the confrontation between Macri's and Kirchner's factions; it has infiltrated their own ranks. Both groups are so absorbed in their own affairs that they haven't managed to evolve their message to resonate with society. The playing field is muddied by this internal strife. When this moment of anger subsides, it will be necessary to reach agreements. It's not impossible to sit down with those on the other side. It's crucial to seek consensus and find basic agreements by applying this model of dialogue that has never been fully implemented in Argentina.